PrintablePaperTrailWhoscounting.net

Justice in the life and conduct of the State is possible only as first it resides in the hearts and souls of the citizens.” -Plato

The hotly contested subject of to Paper Trail or Not to Paper Trail has dogged the Senate and the House for some time. Republicans in Congress successfully fought off the Democrats Legislation introduced time and time again for a paper verification or record of the vote. They battled the first Representative Rush Holt bill calling for a paper trail, they battled in Ohio against the paper trail proposition by State Senator Teresa Fedor. Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, like most all the paper record opponents, simply claimed “There’s no need for paper receipts.” He went so far as to denounce any attempt to require a paper trail as an effort to “derail” election reform. Huh?

A former Diebold elections division executive who is currently CEO of Advanced Voting Systems, Van Pelt, is quoted stating that paper trails on the machines are “--simply not advisable. Attaching a paper printer to the side of voting machines would inevitably lead to problems.” He adds that printers could “break down” or “have other technical failures, and that would damage the process.”

No, I suppose we wouldn’t want to introduce any “technical failures” into our election systems... That would be foolish.

This harkens us back to the Election Center. You remember, the “Time Travelers.” They offer their objections to paper trails with the spurious argument that a printer can –“run out of ink, ribbon or paper.” A frightful proposition indeed, given we have tabulators that can run out of steam midday and start counting backwards on a whim! They then further this hollow rationale with: “Paper can jam. Printers can be disconnected from power source, meaning having to repair the units, and they add to the weight of the units,” and so on -- to create an altogether non-compelling case against the voter’s verification of the vote.

But wait a minute—what happened to all that “elections aren’t perfect- get over it” reasoning that greets our every plea for improved election systems’ security?

If we’re forced to blindly accept fundamentally flawed, malfunctioning e-voting machines and ballot-counting systems... why then must we reject even the possibility of some potentially imperfect printers that might— Gasp!—run out of ink?!

Good question.

HAVA (Help America Vote Act) of 2002, had stated one of its goals to be; “Replacement of punch card and lever voting machines.” That replacement would be with DRE Touch Screens and other electronic methods of casting and tabulation. Plucking the ballot from the hands of the voter and turning it over to digital cyberspace and the hands of the few corporations and select election officials.

Senators Hillary Clinton and Bob Graham had a bill to require paper trails on DRE/ Touch Screens be installed prior to the November 2004 election. It didn’t happen. Senator Graham called the bill a “no brainer.” Senator Clinton went further to state to the press that “without a voter verified paper trail, GOP leaning corporations might program voting machines to help Republicans steal elections.”

In 2003, Kevin Shelley, former Secretary of State in California mandated that all e-voting systems must produce a voter verified paper trail (VVPT) by July, 2006. As his current “successor,” Bruce McPherson, has some staff ties to Diebold — we are wary and uncertain of the outcome. See Diebold’s new paper-thin paper trail “solution” below. A July 2005 San Diego election may have yet again changed the status on the California- Diebold already stormy relationship... See Updates for more.

Ever ahead of the pack, New Jersey Congressman Rush Holt (D), introduced House bill HR 2239 —the Voter Confidence Act http://holt.house.gov/issues2.cfm?id=5996 -- in October 2003, insisting on a paper trail and Open Source Code for DRE’s. He started with 3 co-sponsors and worked his way up to an impressive 149 co-sponsors http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR02239:@@@P , including some prominent Republicans. However, Ohio Congressman Bob Ney (R), became the chief naysayer (pun intended) to rally against Holt’s bill and attempt to block its passage. He informed Holt that he wouldn’t even allow a hearing on the bill, and because he was chairman of that committee... his word held. Not until significant pressure was put upon him, did Ney-sayer relent and allow hearings to be held. But, alas the bill did not pass...

The follow up to HR 2239 is Holt’s HR 550 http://holt.house.gov/display2.cfm?id=6282&type=Home , currently in the House, which expands on the Voter Confidence Act. This is being referred to by some as the Gold Standard of election reform bills. Others feel it’s not sufficient and would be like putting lipstick on a pig... At this point – the pig could use all the help it can get.

Athan Gibbs (Long time Auditor, Accountant and Inventor of TruVote Systems) offered two paper trails per vote;

“Electronic voting machines that don’t supply a paper trail go against every principle of accounting and auditing that’s being taught in American Business schools. These machines are set up to provide paper trails. No business in America would buy machinery that doesn’t provide a paper trail to audit and verify transactions ---- it’s absurd!”

Rebecca Mercuri PhD. - Computer Scientist, Radcliffe fellow, current research fellow at Harvard -- has over14 years of research into electronic voting. Ten years ago she invented a system of security safeguard employing a paper ballot under glass and touch screen. Total estimated cost of the system per machine would have been around $300-600. She has pioneered and advocated verified paper ballots non-stop.

1700 computer scientists from across the US signed a petition calling for paper verification of the vote. Last summer (2004) over 350,000 citizens signed petitions demanding Voter Verified Paper Ballots in America. As of August, 2005, 25 states have enacted legislation requiring Paper Trails of some sort for computer based election equipment, with Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York and Oregon being the last five to sign on. Fourteen other states are considering similar legislation. This is progress.

Public interest groups with paper trail petitions garnered half a million signatures. Lou Dobbs CNN quick poll calling for paper receipts of electronic votes ran 5735 to 85 in favor of them.

Diebold certainly knows a good opportunity when they see it. “So what’s all the fuss about paper?” - they’ve been rhetorically asking us for years now, while their ATMs spit out printed receipts in 90 countries across the world. Now, given the slight denting to their corporate image from the now infamous Wally O ‘Dell declaration to deliver Ohio to George Bush, followed by all those pesky computer scientists publicly denouncing their systems as fatally flawed in test after scathing test -- not to mention that 2.6 million dollar settlement in California for illegally uncertified voting systems, and so on -- they decided to step up to the paper plate – so to speak- and introduce us to their innovative new AccuView Printer (TM) Module!

http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=106584&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=667620&highlight=

They cleverly call it a “Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail.” Only problem is—the voter can’t take their verification with them, like they do on the Diebold ATM’s. The voter will not be able to remove their VVPAT. The press release tells us that the Voter may “privately view” their selection “under a transparent surface” – causing me to shout Hallelujah! We finally have SOMETHING about our elections that is transparent -- outside of the partisan vendors’ litany of lame excuses for their systems utter failure to pass security tests, that is.

Diebold - ever the beacon of security - assures us that the “the enclosure of the AccuView Printer Module is lockable to provide additional security for cast ballot selections.”

It’s lockable.

It’s laughable.

We are right back to square one - “Just Trust Us” again. And why shouldn’t we, after all? See "Diebold" Chapter if you haven’t already... But it gets better. In the event of a hand recount... guess where they now intend to find our votes that they’ve safely stored for us in their “locked enclosure?”

Inside of GEMS! That’s correct -- GEMS software will spew out our votes in case we really do need them verified in a recount. (See "GEMS" Chapter and prepare to feel dizzy.)

Are we supposed to believe that the largest ATM manufacturer in America, with revenues hovering just below $3 billion per year, can’t even muster up a lousy piece of paper for us as a verification? Diebold’s latest ATM models offer features that will: print your account statements; print your checks; provide travellers checks; pay your bills; give you movie tickets; use fingerprint ID; provide audio systems for the blind; and offer colorful graphics and videos. The only thing they don’t do is make your dinner. One can only conclude that – in the eyes of Diebold - our vote in America is not nearly as important as our checking account or our movie seats.

Brit Williams, chief electronic voting advisor for the state of Georgia, patronizes voters who request a paper trail in their all-Diebold all-the-time state by saying, “—If you, for political reasons, feel a paper trail is desirable to make voters feel warm and fuzzy, I don’t have a problem with that.” Meanwhile... Georgia, however, did not get a paper trail. Voters in Georgia, State of sweet fuzzy peaches, are NOT feeling either warm or fuzzy these days...

There is a healthy debate to be had over how much paper, for what purposes, and what-on-earth would be printed upon it? The TruVote system had the voter not only taking one of its two verification copies home with them for future reference in the event of a recount—but, if the voter wished to verify even further-- they could then use that receipt to double-check the proper recording of their vote from home, via internet or telephone. Some fear that the paper receipt in the voters own hands might reintroduce a vulnerability to “vote buying”, thus corrupting the system even further. Begging the question, how much trust can we afford to extend to the voter?

My answer to this query would be to weigh the vote buying risk versus our present menace, the electronic risk. What are the statistics of vote buying in the past decade? How widespread is it in terms of estimated numbers of votes affected? Then compare those numbers to the potential of millions of electronically stolen votes in a few keyboard strokes and mouse clicks from a tabulator program-- in under five minutes.

The number of operatives needed to pull off any massive vote buying conspiracy would seem prohibitive to make it a practical scheme. Juxtaposed against the relative ease of electronic tampering that can be smoothly carried out with a skeletal crew of fewer than six people. Were it a choice between the two, I’d say-- vote buying = small potatoes. In addition, in this era of electronic voting with systems designed specifically to be manipulated without detection...why would anyone bother to buy votes? When your tabulators can simply position them wherever a programmer would like them—it almost seems provincial.

As for protection of the private ballot concept, one solution might be for a voter to withdraw a receipt, not unlike an ATM paper record, which verifies the transaction and not the transactor.

Lest we forget....The largest manufacturer of ATM’s in America —Diebold.

They know how to do this.

The next issue, and perhaps the more important one, is that of the sanctity of the voter’s intent, which must be protected at all costs. The American voter needs to know that his choices – however ill conceived, lacking in judgment, or swayed by improper influence—that his intent will be enacted. In the case of electronic vote fraud, or even electronic error.... the voter’s intent is relegated to irrelevance. It takes a backseat to expedience. The voter’s intent can be effortlessly bypassed by the Corporation’s intent... the Corporation that’s in control of the vote.

So now we need to confront the fact that when we do get our paper receipts, assuming they’ll be the kind left at the precinct or district after we vote... who do we entrust to be in charge of that precious property and to produce it in the event of a recount or contest? Florida’s Glenda Hood? Jeb Bush? Ohio’s Kenneth Blackwell? Diebold’s Wally O’Dell? E,S&S? Triad? Sequoia?

At the end of the day the crux of the matter keeps returning to-- TRUST. How much do we need and where is it best placed? Do we trust the systems and their vendors to record our vote the way we intended it, to store it for safekeeping, and to later produce it with integrity for a recount? Or do we trust the voters to verify their own votes and oversee the ballots custody? Do we trust the systems—rigged or not rigged—that have been proven to be severely flawed and at best lacking protection and security?

One idea would be a system in which the electorate decides to entrust the ballots or paper receipts to an Escrow holding company, as with critical financial transactions, which would perform the role of custodian of the vote while maintaining a neutral, third party, unaffiliated stance. A sort of Price Waterhouse for Election Ballots. Ideally, they would be carefully scrutinized and overseen by state laws strictly reprimanding any evidence of bias or infraction, minimally with a revocation of the business license.

Another idea would be the creation of a type of a Jury pool, composed of citizens, local volunteers representing both or all parties, who would be assigned the key task of oversight of the paper receipts. An incentive for this duty would be helpful—outside of civic interest; such as employers compensating for the time. Election Day declared as a national holiday seems a given first step for any improved voting scenarios.

The first recorded use of paper ballots http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ appears to have been in ancient Rome in the year 139 BC. Here in the United States, we saw our first version of the paper ballot in a 1629 vote to select the Pastor for the Salem Church—and we all know how well that turned out.... In the mid-1800’s in America, the trust was vested in the voter. Just prior to casting his vote, he would place his hand on the Bible and take an oath to a Judge-- swearing that he was entitled to vote, and that he had not yet voted in that particular election.

The Rutheford B. Hayes upset of 1876, wherein Hayes won the electoral but not the popular vote, led the people to examine their voting systems more closely for evidence of possible fraud. When reports of widespread election fraud surrounded the general election of 1884, the alerted public now paid closer attention. The result was, by 1888, the introduction of the Australian Ballot and the Lever voting machines to the United States for the first time. The ballot counting was observed by teams comprised of both parties’ representatives who would monitor each other. The Lever machines were designed to mechanically “protect the voter from rascaldom.”

There’s an idea we can all get behind.

Flash forward from punching chads and pulling levers to touching screens, electronics, and data processing.

Election officials in Fairfax, Virginia recently organized against the VVPAT (voter verified paper audit trail) claiming that voters who wish to create chaos could lie and say the paper record did NOT reflect their actual vote, and the election officials couldn’t prove or disprove it. They said “At some point you’ve got to trust the system.” Yet they don’t seem willing to extend that same benefit of the doubt to the voters. Trust the system, not the voters. Since when do voters go to the polls “wishing to create chaos”?

I thought they went to cast their vote...

This new blame the voter, not the system program is very troubling in light of the weighted evidence supporting the very opposite argument. We don’t have significant evidence showing massive numbers of voters committing fraud and thereby overturning election outcomes. Almost sounds like a Conspiracy Theory to suggest it. There is, however, no shortage of test results damning the faulty security of the systems we use and plenty of proof of the incestuous relationships of the companies who make them. Maybe if we, the voters, provided millions of dollars to the states they wouldn’t be so quick to cast aspersions against us.

Wait a minute...we do! It’s called TAXES.